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Abstract 
 
This paper adopts a game-theoretical approach to analyse the LIBOR fixing 
mechanism. Several non-zero-sum LIBOR Games are modelled and then 
solved using a standard Bayes Nash solution. It is shown that collusive 
behaviour between LIBOR panel banks, or between banks and money 
market brokers, can lead to LIBOR fixings that deviate from what could be 
regarded as the true funding costs of the banks. However, collusive 
behaviour is not a prerequisite for such outcomes. Assuming players (banks) 
are rational and act out of self-interest, their endowments (such as LIBOR-
indexed derivatives portfolios), or the stigma attached by signalling a 
relatively high funding cost, can provide LIBOR panel banks with sufficient 
incentives to submit quotes deviating from their actual funding cost. The 
trimming process, widely regarded as a hurdle for outright and single-
handed manipulation, is shown to be overwhelmingly ineffective. 
Moreover, binding rules or constraints introduced in order to enhance 
transparency provide disappointing results. In sum, it is argued that the 
LIBOR games are characterized by an inherent structure whereby banks 
have the means, opportunity and incentive to submit deceptive quotes, 
leading to outcomes (LIBOR fixings) that deviate from the true average of 
the banks funding cost. Banks are given the chance to influence the LIBOR 
in a direction that is beneficial to them - stemming from the exclusive 
privilege to be able to play this game, in other words to participate in the 
LIBOR fixing process.  
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1. LIBOR Manipulation? 
 
The issue of possible manipulation of the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) first received 
media attention when it was raised by Mollenkamp & Whitehouse (2008) in the Wall Street Journal 
in May 2008. The authors argued that some LIBOR panel banks had deliberately quoted LIBOR 
rates that were too low to be justified by their credit standing reflected in the credit default swap 
(CDS) market. Although the article did not claim outright manipulation, it argued that banks ‘may 
have been low-balling their borrowing rates to avoid looking desperate for cash’.  
 
The actual LIBOR fixing mechanism is simple. A designated calculation agent collects the 
submitted quotes from the individual LIBOR panel banks before noon. The trader or other bank 
person at the cash desk or treasury submits his or her quote from the bank terminal, and the other 
banks do the same without being able to see each others’ quotes. During a short period, the 
calculation agent audits and checks the quotes for obvious errors and then conducts the ‘trimming’ 
– the omission the highest and lowest quotes (the number which depends on the sample size). 
Thereafter, the arithmetic mean is calculated, rounded to the specified number of decimals and 
published at a certain time mid-day (British Bankers Association, 2012).  
 
Although the LIBOR is an observable benchmark, the individually submitted LIBOR quotes do not 
need to correspond to the actual funding cost faced by the panel banks. The integrity of the LIBOR 
fixing mechanism is thus based upon the assumption that the banks reveal the truth. The assumption 
that the LIBOR itself is based upon actual market transactions is in fact central to previous attempt 
to decompose the LIBOR into current and expected future interest rates, credit and liquidity risk. 
Decomposing money market risk premia (such as the LIBOR-OIS spread) in the recent literature 
has almost become synonymous with assessing the effectiveness of central bank policy in dealing 
with the current global financial crisis.
2
  
 
The contents of the Wall Street Journal article gave support to anecdotal evidence from active 
market participants, who had been claiming that the LIBOR systematically deviated from 
observable money market transactions. Already in the early days of the current global financial 
crisis, numerous market participants began to observe that, despite the LIBOR beginning to rise 
substantially; it was still significantly lower than where the money market de facto appeared to be 
trading  - or at least ought to have been trading had there been enough market liquidity. For 
instance, traders found it inconceivable that some banks that were practically shut out of interbank 
funding (such as UBS and several other large European banks) submitted LIBOR quotes at levels 
well below where the market reportedly was trading. However, the British Bankers Association 
                                                          
2
 See for instance Bank of England, 2007; McAndrews, Sarkar & Wang, 2008; Poskitt, 2011; Schwartz, 2010. 
5 
 
(BBA), which oversees the LIBOR fixing mechanism, took a defensive stance versus these claims 
and defended the integrity of the process. No evidence of manipulation was found after an internal 
investigation had been conducted, but the BBA nonetheless promised more governance and scrutiny 
(British Bankers Association, 2008).  
 
Nonetheless, in 2011, regulators and financial supervisors in several countries began investigating 
alleged LIBOR manipulation by traders and money market brokers directly or very closely linked to 
the fixing process. Although the investigations are still ongoing and only some conclusions have 
been made so far, initial reports pointed two, but interlinked, angles in the investigation process. 
One related to possible collusion between two or more banks in the LIBOR rate setting process 
aimed at influencing the fixing in their favour, as this might enable them to surpass the hurdle of the 
so-called trimming process.
3
 The second angle related to the possible pressure put by banks on 
money market brokers to influence the LIBOR fixing. Thus, third-party voice brokers, acting as 
middle-men, also came under scrutiny, having possibly conspired with banks, or groups of banks, to 
influence the LIBOR submissions. Namely, if the money market were to be volatile or illiquid, 
banks might have the incentive to try to influence what the voice broker signals to the rest of the 
market. This scenario was discussed by Mackenzie (2012), when describing the dilemma a voice 
broker can face in favouring one particular bank ahead of others. The relationship-based trader-
broker model can be seen as system where both stand to benefit mutually: the broker by following 
the instructions from his or her largest and most profitable account, and the bank by gaining from 
the more ‘independent’ status the broker holds in the market by often being better informed and 
‘required’ to adhere to anonymity rules. 
 
Although the investigation covers a large number of banks, at the time of writing three (Citibank, 
UBS and Barclays) have been penalised by financial regulators for attempting to manipulate the 
LIBOR. As stated by the FSA regarding the financial penalty imposed upon Barclays, the bank had 
made ‘submissions which formed part of the LIBOR and EURIBOR setting process that took into 
account requests from Barclays’ interest rate derivatives traders. These trades were motivated by 
profit and sought to benefit Barclays’ trading positions’. The regulator also stated that the bank had 
‘seek to influence the EURIBOR submissions of other banks contributing to the rate setting 
process’ and ‘reduced its LIBOR submissions during the financial crisis as a result of senior 
management’s concerns over the negative media comment’. (Financial Services Agency (2011abc); 
Financial Services Authority (2012); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (2012)) 
 
This paper illustrates how the LIBOR rate setting process, or fixing mechanism, can be analysed 
from a game-theoretical perspective. It is shown how collusive behaviour between LIBOR panel 
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banks, or between banks and brokers, can lead to LIBOR fixings that deviate from what could be 
regarded as the ‘true’ funding costs of the banks – more widely referred to as a ‘manipulated 
LIBOR’. However, collusive behaviour is not a prerequisite for such outcomes. Instead, LIBOR-
indexed derivatives portfolios, or the stigma attached by signalling a relatively high funding cost, 
can provide LIBOR panel banks with sufficient incentives to submit quotes deviating from their 
actual funding cost. Hereby, the ‘LIBOR games’ highlight a fundamental flaw in the LIBOR rate 
setting process. It can be seen as a structure where players (LIBOR banks) have the means, 
opportunity and incentive to submit deceptive quotes, resulting in outcomes (LIBOR fixings) 
deviating from the ‘true’ bank funding cost. Constraints put in place to hinder such outcomes are 
shown to be ineffective.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, three different cooperative and non-cooperative 
‘LIBOR games’, where players have incentives in terms of endowments, are modelled and solved 
using a standard Bayes Nash solution concept. Section 3 introduces a purely non-cooperative game, 
studying the effect of the stigma attached with submitting a relatively high LIBOR, as well as 
considering the impact of potential reputational constraints or requirements to trade at submitted 
quotes.  Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. Three Single-Period LIBOR Games 
 
2.1. Assumptions and Rules of the Games 
 
i) Players 
 
Consider 3 different single-period games - henceforth called the ‘LIBOR Base Game’, the ‘LIBOR 
Collusion Game’ and the ‘LIBOR Bribe Game’ respectively. In each game, there are 4 players (i.e. 
LIBOR panel banks), the smallest number of players in order to account for the so-called trimming 
mechanism: 
 
  {           }          (1) 
 
ii) Endowments 
 
Players start with an endowment (denoted ‘E’): 
 
   { 
       }           (2) 
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where E
+
>0, E
0
=0 and E
-
<0. The endowment is a derivatives portfolio benchmarked against the 
LIBOR. For the sake of argument, let us simply assume that a player with a positive endowment 
(E
+
) benefits from a high LIBOR, players with E
-
 from a low LIBOR and players with no 
endowment (E
0
) are indifferent (see Appendix A for a more thorough financial interpretation of the 
endowment).  
 
iii) The Money Market 
 
All players face the same bank funding cost, denoted ‘M’ (where M is a unique number > 0). At t0, 
the interbank money market trades at M, and M is equivalent to the previous day’s LIBOR fixing 
(LF(t0)).  
 
In the LIBOR Base Game and the LIBOR Collusion Game, M is common knowledge. In the 
LIBOR Bribe Game, however, M is uncertain and can be any number within a range [M
L
, M
H
], 
where M
L
 ≤ M ≤ MH. Let it also be that ML = M – α, and MH = M + α.  
 
iv) The LIBOR Fixing 
 
Most importantly though, the LIBOR is not a market per se, but an average of where the selected 
panel banks argue the market is. For the LIBOR, banks are asked ‘at what rate could you borrow 
funds, were you to do so by asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in a reasonable market 
size just prior to 11 am?’ The EURIBOR should be ‘the rate at which Euro interbank term deposits 
are offered by one prime bank to another prime bank within the EMU zone’. (British Bankers 
Association, 2012; European Banking Federation, 2012ab)  
 
The LIBOR fixing rule states that all players are supposed to submit their true funding cost to the 
LIBOR fixing mechanism. However, assume all players are able to submit quotes within a range 
[M
L
, M
H
], where M
L
 ≤ M ≤ MH. Thus, any individual LIBOR quote, Li (where Li ≠ M) can be 
regarded as a ‘deceptive quote’. Let it also be that LM = M, LH = L + α, and LL = M - α, where 0 < α 
< M. 
 
The actual LIBOR fixing mechanism is straight-forward. Players submit their quotes at t1 without 
being able to see each others’ quotes. Thereafter, a third party (a designated independent calculation 
agent) audits and checks the quotes for obvious errors and then conducts the trimming process – the 
omission of the highest and lowest quotes. Thereafter, the arithmetic mean is calculated and 
published. The LIBOR fixing (LF) at t2 is thus: 
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       {  }    {  }
 
         (3) 
 
Henceforth, LF will denote the expected LIBOR fixing at t1. 
 
v) Payoffs 
 
Let us assume that players act out of self-interest and are rational, and that this is common 
knowledge. In each game, players try to maximize the payoffs from their respective endowments, 
with the expected payoff function
4
 for player Pi at t1:  
 
                     (4) 
 
vi) Strategy in the LIBOR Base Game 
 
As the endowment is private knowledge, players set equal probabilities for the other players to have 
either E
+
, E
0
 or E
-
 so that: 
 
      
         
         
             (5) 
 
Further, players can choose to submit a ‘high’ LIBOR quote (LH), a ‘fair’ LIBOR quote (LM) or a 
‘low’ LIBOR quote (LL):  
 
   { 
       }          (6) 
 
Let it also be that player Pi only submits a quote ≠ M if there is a marginal benefit in doing so, with 
the optimal strategy being: 
 
  
  {
       
       
        
       
  
       
       
        
       
  
       
       
        
       
  
      (7) 
 
Thus, player Pi sets the probability   
 of player Pj playing high if   
    ,   
  if    
     and   
  if 
  
    : 
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      {    
      
 } 
    
      {    
      
 }          (8) 
    
      {    
      
 } 
 
Figure 1:  Time Line of Event (LIBOR Base Game) 
t0 t1 t2 
The endowment of each 
player is known. The 
knowledge is private. 
Each player chooses a 
strategy and submits a 
LIBOR quote to maximize his 
expected payoff. 
The LIBOR fixing is 
calculated and revealed, as 
are the individual quotes. 
The payoffs are calculated. 
 
vii) Strategy in the LIBOR Collusion Game 
 
In the LIBOR Collusion Game, let us assume that the endowment is no longer private, but ‘semi-
private’ information. To be precise, player Pi (with E
≠0
) knows that the endowment of player Pj is Ej 
= Ei ≠ 0, and they decide to collude by submitting identical quotes. Hence: 
 
        
    (      
 )   (      
 )            (9) 
 
Player Pi (with E
0
) has nothing to gain by colluding, giving the following strategy options for the 
players: 
 
  
  {              }          (10) 
 
Like in the LIBOR Base Game, let it also be that player Pi only submits a quote ≠ M if there is a 
marginal benefit in doing so, with the optimal strategy being: 
 
     
  {
  
    ( 
    )    ( 
    )     ( 
    )      
  
       
     ( 
    )       
     ( 
    )
  
    ( 
    )    ( 
    )     ( 
    )      
  
    (11) 
 
Also, player Pi sets the probability   
 of player Pj playing high if   
    ,   
  if    
     and   
  if 
  
    : 
 
    
      {    
      
 } 
    
      {    
      
 }         (12) 
    
      {    
      
 } 
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Figure 2:  Time Line of Events (LIBOR Collusion Game) 
t0 t1 t2 
The endowment of each 
player is known, and semi-
private. Players Pi and Pj 
(with Ej = Ei ≠ 0) know each 
others’ endowment, but not 
that of the others. 
Each player chooses a 
strategy (with possible 
collusion) and submits a 
LIBOR quote to the 
calculation agent to 
maximize his expected 
payoff. 
The LIBOR fixing is 
calculated and revealed, as 
are the individual quotes. 
Payoffs are calculated. 
 
 
viii) Strategy in the LIBOR Bribe Game  
 
In the LIBOR Bribe Game, the endowment is private knowledge and collusion with another player 
is not possible. Let us assume that players sets equal probabilities for the other players to have 
either E
+
, E
0
 or E
-
 so that: 
 
      
         
         
             (13) 
 
However, in this game, all players know that M can be any number within a range [M
L
, M
H
], where 
M
L
 ≤ M ≤ MH. Further, let us assume that there is a third party (money market) broker that is better 
informed, from whom the precise level of M can be obtained. This third party can be bribed by 
player Pi to signal a deceptive level of M. In practice, the bribe by a bank could also simply be a 
threat to cease doing business with the broker and go to a competitor. As such, a bribe, or treat, 
might put the broker in an awkward position as his revenue depends not only on his long-term 
reputation of being fair and objective, but also on the trading volume of often just a few trading 
accounts. Therefore, a bribe or treat can work to cements a strong relationship. From the broker’s 
perspective, the best source of information normally comes from the most active banks, which 
normally also are the most active trading banks in LIBOR-related instruments. The strategy options 
when bribes are allowed become:  
 
  
  {                    }         (14) 
 
Let it also be that player Pi only submits a quote ≠ M if there is a marginal benefit in doing so, with 
the optimal strategy being: 
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Further, player Pi sets the probability   
 of player Pj playing high if   
    ,   
  if    
     and   
  
if   
    : 
 
    
      {       
      
    
} 
    
      {       
      
 } 
    
      {       
      
 }          (16) 
    
      {       
      
    
} 
    
      {       
      
 } 
 
Figure 3:  Time Line of Events (LIBOR Bribe Game) 
t0 t1 t2 
The endowment of each 
player is known. The 
knowledge is private. 
 
Each player chooses a 
strategy (with a possible 
bribe) and submits a LIBOR 
quote to the calculation 
agent to maximize his 
expected payoff. 
 
The LIBOR fixing is 
calculated and revealed, as 
are the individual quotes. 
The payoffs are calculated. 
 
 
2.2. Outcomes of the Single-Period LIBOR Games 
 
If player Pi assumes all other players will submit quotes equal to M, the trimming process is 
effective, as any quote ≠ M will be omitted and the expected LIBOR fixing will be equal to M. If, 
on the other hand, player Pi believes that players might have underlying incentives to deceive, the 
expected LIBOR fixing depends on the probabilities he sees for each possible outcome. Assuming 
that all players act out of self-interest and are rational, and that this is common knowledge, we can 
work out the best strategy given each endowment. By using a Bayes Nash solution concept for these 
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games, we can see how the LIBOR fixings can differ from M, as it depends on the expected strategy 
of each of the four players (see Appendix B for more thorough explanation). 
 
i) Outcome of the LIBOR Base Game 
 
In all three LIBOR games, each player has the means and opportunity to submit a deceptive LIBOR 
quote, as a result of the fixing mechanism and by having the exclusively privilege of being allowed 
to play the game. 
 
However, a deceptive quote (i.e. where Li≠M) will only be submitted if a player has the incentive to 
do so, i.e. if Ei≠0. This is intuitive, as players expect that not only themselves, but also the others, 
are rational and will act out of self-interest. As each player knows that, on average, one other player 
will choose the same strategy as himself, the trimming process does not act as a hindrance to submit 
a deceptive quote.  It is irrelevant which one of the two players will be omitted through the 
trimming process, as one of them will still have an impact.  
 
As a result, the optimal strategy for players with E≠0 is submitting deceptive quotes with the aim to 
skew the LIBOR fixing in their favour: 
 
  
    
      
  
    
                (17) 
  
    
      
 
The expected payoffs are: 
 
  
    
    
   
 
 
   
  
    
    
              (18) 
  
    
    
   
 
 
   
 
The expected LIBOR fixing for players with E≠0 hence deviates from M: 
 
     
    
     
 
 
  
     
    
              (19) 
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ii) Outcome of the LIBOR Collusion Game 
 
In the LIBOR Collusion Game, player Pi (with E
≠0
) knows that the endowment of player Pj is Ej = Ei 
≠ 0. Both players know that they are better off colluding by agreeing to play the same strategy at t1. 
This alters the probability set as Player Pi now knows the strategy of player Pj with certainty.  
 
The expected payoff increases for players with E
≠0
. Player Pi (with E
0
) has nothing to gain by 
colluding, and his strategy remains to submit Li=M: 
 
  
    
           
  
    
                  (20) 
  
    
           
 
The expected payoff increases for players involved in collusion: 
 
  
    
     
  
  
   
  
    
                 (21) 
  
    
     
  
  
   
 
Likewise, the expected LIBOR fixing for players with E
≠0
 deviates more from M as the likelihood 
of deceptive LIBOR quotes has increased: 
 
     
       
  
  
  
     
                 (22) 
     
       
  
  
  
 
iii) Outcome of the LIBOR Bribe Game 
 
From the LIBOR Base Game, we know that player Pi knows that players with E
+
 will always play 
high, players with E
- 
will always play low and players with E
0
 will always play fair. However, from 
the assumptions we know that player Pi only submits a quote ≠ M if there is a marginal benefit in 
doing so. If the level of M is uncertain, players with E
0
 will therefore have an incentive to get the 
opinion from the better informed third party broker (who in this case can be bribed). 
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However, player Pi thus knows that one player – on average – can be influenced by the signal sent 
from the broker, as players with E
0
 will always play fair (M) unless he believes the rate might be at 
another level. This can be achieved by paying a bribe (B) to the broker for him to signal that M, in 
fact, is at the higher or lower end of the scale M
L
 ≤ M ≤ MH. Thus, for players with E≠0, bribing the 
broker will be rational if the cost of the bribe is sufficiently low (         ), thereby ensuring 
that neutral players, unintentionally, will submit deceptive quotes. Thus, the optimal strategies are: 
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                  (23) 
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The expected payoffs: 
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                 (24) 
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As a result, the expected LIBOR fixing for players with E
≠0
 deviates more from M compared to the 
LIBOR Base Game if the cost of the bribe is low: 
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3. A LIBOR Game with Reputational Constraint and Stigma Incentive 
 
Let us now disregard the possibility of collusion and bribes, and return to a situation where the 
endowments are private knowledge and M both public knowledge and certain. However, here we 
introduce a new constraint and incentive involving reputation and stigma.  
 
3.1. Assumptions and Rules of the Game 
 
i) Assumptions 
 
At the outset, the assumptions are identical to the LIBOR Base Game, where the 4 players start the 
game with an endowment that is private knowledge. The payoff from this endowment is: 
 
                         (26) 
 
ii) Reputational Constraint 
 
However, in this game, there is a reputational constraint facing all players. This mechanism is put in 
place to prevent players from submitting deceptive LIBOR quotes, and thus giving them an 
incentive to adhere to ‘fair play’. The payoff from the reputational constraint (ρ) is written as: 
 
       ∑                            (27) 
 
Hence, under this arrangement, a player submitting a LIBOR quote Li ≠ M is subject to a payoff 
consisting of two parts and equalling the  sum of profits from others’ deception and the loss from 
their own deception. From a bank’s perspective, the constraint could be interpreted as follows: 
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submitting a deceptive quote might, if discovered, result in less client business, legal costs of being 
under regulatory investigation or even the risk of being excluded from the panel altogether and 
being replaced by another bank. Likewise, if only other panel banks decide to deceive, the bank 
playing fair will receive a reputational boost at the expense of the others.  
 
The constraint could also be interpreted as affecting only the trading desk or treasury, if they were 
required to commit to their quotes in ‘reasonable market size’, where a deceptive quote would be 
exploited monetarily by all other LIBOR panel banks (i.e. similar to a reputational loss). Likewise, 
there would an immediate trading gain should others decide to submit deceptive LIBOR quotes. 
 
iii) Stigma Incentive 
 
The second new variable is the ‘stigma’ (denoted as ‘σ’): 
 
      (
∑   
 
   
 
   )  ,          (28) 
 
According to the British Bankers Association (2012), LIBOR quotes are supposed to reflect ‘where 
the bank can fund itself in the interbank market’. Therefore, an individual quote above the average 
of the panel quotes might be interpreted as a signal that the bank has funding problems relative to 
the others. Likewise, a lower than average quote would signal that the bank is in relatively good 
shape – as individually submitted LIBOR quotes are visible to the whole market, not only to the 
other LIBOR panel banks, after the fixing. The stigma incentive, thus, rewards players submitting a 
below-average quote – regardless of the actual LIBOR fixing. 
 
iv) Payoff function 
 
This LIBOR game involves a trade-off between the endowment and the different constraints, and 
the conflicting incentives this can result in. The payoff function facing each player is: 
 
                                   (29) 
 
v) Strategy of the Game 
 
Let us assume that players sets equal probabilities for the other players to have either E
+
, E
0
 or E
-
 so 
that: 
 
      
         
         
             (30) 
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Further, players can choose to submit a ‘high’ LIBOR quote (LH), a ‘fair’ LIBOR quote (LM) or a 
‘low’ LIBOR quote (LL):  
 
   { 
       }          (31) 
 
Let it also be that player Pi only submits a quote ≠ M if there is a marginal benefit in doing so, with 
the optimal strategy being: 
 
  
         {
       
       
        
       
  
       
       
        
       
  
       
       
        
       
  
      (32) 
 
Thus, player Pi sets the probability   
 of player Pj playing high if   
    ,   
  if    
     and   
  if 
  
    : 
 
    
      {    
      
 } 
    
      {    
      
 }          (33) 
    
      {    
      
 } 
 
Figure 4:  Time Line of Events (LIBOR Game with Reputation/Stigma)  
t0 t1 t2 
The endowment of each player 
is known (but not those of the 
others) 
Constraints and incentives are 
announced. 
 
Each player chooses a strategy 
and submits a LIBOR quote to 
the calculation agent to 
maximize his expected payoff 
subject to constraints and 
incentives. 
The LIBOR fixing is calculated 
and revealed, as are the 
individual quotes. The payoffs 
are calculated. 
 
 
3.2. Outcomes of the LIBOR Reputation/Stigma Game 
 
Let us consider the two new variables in turn. At the outset, we know that the optimal strategy of 
players with E
0
 is to play ‘fair’. However, if the reputational constraint is large enough (ρ ≥ E/9), 
players with E
≠0
 will also choose to play ‘fair’. Thus, the expected outcomes of the game will 
depend on the ratio between ρ and E.  
 
The stigma incentive has an impact if σ > 0, as players with E0 now also will have the incentive to 
submit deceptive quotes, namely low quotes. The expected payoff matrix changes, as players take 
into account that the optimal strategy of players with E
0
 is now to play low. Under this scenario, fair 
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play is not an optimal strategy, and the expected LIBOR decreases. However, above a certain σ-
ratio, even players with E
+
 will opt to play ‘low’ as the benefit of submitting a high quote to 
maximize the profit of the endowment is outweighed by the stigma of being perceived as a player 
with funding difficulties. 
 
For {ρ =0 ∩ σ =0}, the outcomes are identical to that of the LIBOR Base Game. However, for {ρ 
>0 ∩ σ > 0} and again using the Bayes Nash solution concept as in the previous 3 games, we get 6 
different equilibria, as the different thresholds where players would choose to change strategy yield 
different ‘scenarios’ with altered probability distribution. Each equilibrium has a different set of 
optimal strategies, expected payoffs and expected LIBOR fixings: 
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Interpreting each outcome in turn, we can see that under Scenario I, where: 
 
 (    
 
 
 )        ,          (37) 
 
the reputational constraint is not large enough to prevent players from submitting deceptive LIBOR 
quotes. Likewise, the stigma constraint does not tempt players with E
≠0
 to submit ‘low’ quotes. The 
expected LIBOR is identical to that of the outcome of the LIBOR Base game. 
 
Under Scenario II, where: 
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 (        
 
 
 )  (    
 
 
 )         (38) 
 
the reputational constraint is still fairly small, but the stigma constraint has increased – prompting 
players with E
0
 to switch strategy, namely to play ‘low’ instead of ‘fair’. The expected LIBOR falls 
as the probability of low submissions increases. 
 
Scenario III, where: 
 
(   
 
 
      ),          (39) 
 
implies that the reputational constraint is significant. In fact, it is large enough for all players to 
‘initially consider playing fair’. However, the stigma constraint is also significant enough for 
players with E
-
 to play low (boosted by the payoff from the endowment), but for not enough for 
others to deviate from their fair quotes. The expected LIBOR equilibrium is slightly below M.  
 
Scenario IV, where: 
 
(        
 
 
 ),          (40) 
 
also implies that the reputational constraint is large enough for players to initially consider playing 
fair. However, the stigma constraint is now large enough for players with E
≤0
 to play low, whereas 
players with E
+
 stick to their fair quotes. The expected LIBOR equilibrium is lower than under 
Scenario III. 
 
Under Scenario V, where: 
 
 (     
 
 
 ),           (41) 
 
the stigma incentive is considerable – inducing all players to submit low LIBOR quotes regardless 
of their endowments or the reputational constraint. The expected LIBOR fixing reaches its 
minimum, i.e. M-α.  
 
Thus, Scenario VI where: 
 
 (     
 
 
 )            (42) 
22 
 
 
is the only situation where no deceptive quotes can be expected to be submitted. This is when the 
reputational constraint is large, whereas the stigma constraint is small enough not to give incentive 
for any players to deviate from the fair quotes. Here, the expected LIBOR always equals M. This 
could be regarded as the only scenario where the LIBOR fixing process works as intended, namely 
to reflect the banks’ true funding costs.  
 
 
4. Concluding Discussion 
 
The LIBOR games presented in this paper illustrate that if panel banks have LIBOR-based 
derivatives portfolios, are rational and act out of self-interest, they not only have the means and 
opportunity, but also the incentive to submit deceptive LIBOR quotes – resulting in a LIBOR fixing 
no longer reflecting the ‘true’ funding cost of the panel banks. Should two or more banks collude, 
or have the opportunity to collude with a money-market voice broker, the likelihood of what we 
could regard as off-market LIBOR equilibria increases. However, whereas collusion of this kind 
makes this more likely, and the impact greater, it is by no means a pre-requisite. Because, at the 
core of the LIBOR games lies the importance of the belief each player has about what others will do 
and how this will affect the optimal strategy. The LIBOR games are not zero-sum games. Instead, 
LIBOR panel banks, by having the exclusive privilege to play these ‘games’, are able to influence 
the LIBOR that is beneficial to them. The trimming process can act as a hindrance for banks to 
submit deceptive quotes, but is no guarantee in itself as banks should expect others also to act out of 
self-interest. Deception can thus become the norm, rather than the exception, depending on the 
various constraints and incentives banks are presented with. 
 
Banks, being profit-maximising and the most frequent users of instruments indexed to the LIBOR, 
naturally have an interest in the outcome of the LIBOR fixing. LIBOR-indexed derivatives 
portfolios (called ‘endowments’ in these games) serve as an incentive to submit deceptive quotes, 
and these incentives can be seen as having strengthened in tandem with the growth in the 
derivatives  markets linked to the benchmark. The notional amount of outstanding LIBOR-based 
derivative contracts has now reached astonishing levels; with the BBA estimating that USD 10 
trillion of loans and USD 350 trillion of interest rate swaps alone are indexed by the LIBOR (U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 2012). According to statistics compiled by the Bank for 
International Settlements (2011), the notional amount of outstanding OTC interest rate derivatives 
contracts amounted to USD 554 trillion in the first half of 2011. The LIBOR, and its equivalents, 
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are thus the by far most frequently used benchmarks for IRS, FRAs and OTC interest rate options. 
The annual turnover in the LIBOR-equivalent futures contracts is equally impressive.
5
  
 
Snider & Youle (2009, 2010) base a theory of misreporting incentives upon the individual banks’ 
portfolio exposure to the LIBOR that gives them an incentive to push the benchmark in a particular 
direction. They study three LIBOR panel banks that are American bank holding companies and 
thereby required to provide interest rate derivatives and net interest revenue figures in the quarterly 
Reports on Conditions and Income (Call Reports) to the FDIC. By using the exposure to 
outstanding interest rate swaps as an approximation, the authors find that during the period there 
was a clear incentive for the banks to keep a low LIBOR, thereby supplying evidence that panel 
banks may have acted strategically when submitting their LIBOR quotes. The outcomes of the 
LIBOR games lend support to this argument. 
 
The ‘stigma’ of submitting a relatively high funding costs poises another problem with the LIBOR 
fixing mechanism, as banks inherently have an interest in appearing sound and solid. In theory, the 
LIBOR should not only reflect current and future interest rate expectations, but also credit and 
liquidity risk. Should banks face credit and liquidity constrains, these ought to be reflected in the 
LIBOR submissions and ceteris paribus result in a higher LIBOR fixing, as the banks’ funding 
costs increase. As the individual LIBOR submissions are made public, they serve as a snap-snot of 
the perceived creditworthiness of the banks. This signal to the market is important as the funding 
cost of the bank and its capital and reputation are closely linked.
6
 Downgrades by rating agencies 
are rare events, as are financial statements. The LIBOR, in contrast, is submitted and published 
daily and can reduce the uncertainty of whether a particular bank faces immediate funding problems 
or not. The stigma constraint therefore results from the individual LIBOR submissions being 
common knowledge at the same time as the actual funding cost is private knowledge. This lack of 
transparency, coupled with the natural desire of banks to appear sound at all times thus works as an 
incentive to conceal potential funding problems publicly through the LIBOR signalling process. In 
other words, it works as an incentive to ‘low-ball’ the LIBOR in similar fashion to the stigma of 
having to borrow at the discount window from central banks during the early days of the crisis.
7
 
Submitting a LIBOR quote could signal that the bank is in trouble and thereby having a direct 
negative impact on the CDS price, bond price, share price and so on, which would yet again affect 
the short-term funding cost faced by the bank. 
                                                          
5
 In 2011, the value of Eurodollar futures contracts traded on the CME reached USD 564 trillion. In addition, the 
turnover in options on Eurodollar futures was USD 193 trillion. The corresponding figures for the EURIBOR futures 
and options contracts traded on LIFFE were not far off: EUR 241 trillion and EUR 126 trillion respectively. With 
regards to short sterling futures (the GBP LIBOR futures), the turnover was GBP 58 trillion (Futures Industry 
Association, 2011). 
6
 See for instance Ederington, Yawitz & Roberts (1987). 
7
 As this kind of borrowing was openly disclosed, it proved to be a hurdle for banks in the fear that it could have a direct 
impact on the perceived creditworthiness of an institution. 
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The outcomes of the LIBOR Games also highlight the conflict of interest that might exist within a 
LIBOR panel bank. Trading desks, for instance, could be more concerned about the payoff resulting 
from the LIBOR-indexed derivatives portfolios, whereas the Management might put greater 
emphasis on the ‘stigma constraint’. This issue of loose ‘Chinese Walls’ between departments, 
where one department might increase the pressure put on the LIBOR submitting entity, has to some 
degree been confirmed recently in the case between the Japanese FSA against Citigroup and UBS in 
December 2011, and the UK and US regulators’ against Barclays in July 2012. 
 
Individually submitted LIBOR rates are not binding and LIBOR panel banks do not have to commit 
to their quotes in any way. Instead, the BBA LIBOR rule states that the submitted rate must be 
formed from that bank’s perception of its cost of unsecured funds in the interbank market, i.e. the 
London Money Market (British Bankers Association, 2012). Likewise, the rules for the Tokyo 
Interbank Offered Rate (TIBOR) and the Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR) do not mention 
any requirement to act as a market maker at the submitted rate (Japanese Bankers Association, 
2012; European Banking Federation, 2012ab). However, regardless if a binding rule exists or not, 
the reputational damage of some kind of manipulation should not be totally disregarded. Being seen 
as unfair and putting an own bank’s interests ahead of those of the clients can be equally damaging. 
Moreover, possibly an even more important factor is the informal gentleman agreements about ‘fair 
play’ that exist in financial markets, and it would be unreasonable to assume that even traders are 
not bound by such. Problematically though, agreements such as these tend to break down in a crisis 
situation.  
 
However, some kind of reputational constraint could, both in theory and in practise, be imposed in 
order to prevent banks from submitting rates that deviate from their true funding cost. In this paper, 
the reputational constraint has been modelled similarly to a ‘binding rule’, making it clear that 
LIBOR panel banks not only get penalized by submitting deceptive quotes, but also reap the reward 
in case another bank decides to do so. As such, it resembles a realistic market making scenario 
where a market maker is eager to avoid quoting a misprice that will be exploited by a market taker, 
but at the same time hoping for another market maker to do so and thereby exploiting the market 
making obligation of the latter. It could also be seen as mechanism whereby individual LIBOR 
quotes are checked against real transaction data. This paper, however, shows that the constraint 
mechanism might need to be prohibitively high to have the desired effect, namely to prevent 
LIBOR panel banks from only looking after their own interests. 
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Appendix A - The Endowment in LIBOR Games 
 
In this paper, the endowment refers to the net portfolio exposure to the LIBOR. In simple terms we 
are dealing with how much the net present value (NPV) of the portfolio would change given a 
certain change in the LIBOR (everything else being constant). This could, in other words, relate 
both to the realised profit and loss for a floating rate settlement today, as well as the change in the 
market valuation of future floating payments (benchmarked to the LIBOR) stemming from the 
change in the LIBOR. The easiest way to understand ‘E’, would be to regard it as the ‘delta’ or 
NPV of a LIBOR forward rate agreement (or a Eurodollar futures contract) done in the past. 
Consider an example where: 
 
M = LF(t0) = 1.00% 
α =  0.10% 
E =  $10,000  
 
Here, E
+
 corresponds to having sold 400 Eurodollar futures contracts (having a tick value of USD 
25), and E
-
 to having bought the equivalent amount. In FRA-terms, E
+
 would be equivalent of 
having bought (or paid fixed) approximately USD 400 million worth of 3M LIBOR FRAs – and E- 
of having sold (or received fixed) a similar amount.
8
  
 
LF(t0) corresponds to the LIBOR fixing the previous day, which equals M. This rate is used to mark-
to-market the outstanding FRA contracts (i.e. at 1.00%) or the Eurodollar futures contracts (i.e. at 
99.00). 
 
Assume LF is not only the LIBOR fixing, but also that the fixing of the outstanding contracts takes 
place at t2 (with settlement 2 business days later). The profit or loss stemming from the contracts 
will not only depend on the contract rate (in other words at what level they were done in the past), 
but where they will fix. Thus, the payoff from the single-period game will depend on the movement 
in the LIBOR fixing from t0 to t2: 
 
     (             )           
 
As α = 0.10%, LIBOR panel banks can submit 0.90% (M – α = 1.00% - 0.10% = 0.90%), 1.00% or 
1.10%.  Matrix A2.1 and A2.2 show the expected LIBOR fixings and payoffs from the endowments 
under these assumptions: 
 
 
                                                          
8
 Whereas these amounts might appear large, they are fairly conventional in these particular markets. 
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Matrix A.1: Expected LIBOR Fixings 
LIBOR 
Base 
Game 
 
E
+
 1.0333% 
E
0
 1.0000% 
E
-
 0.9667% 
LIBOR 
Collusion Game 
 
E
+
 1.0722% 
E
0
 1.0000% 
E
-
 0.9278% 
LIBOR 
Bribe Game 
(B<$704) 
 
E
+
 1.0704% 
E
0
 1.0000% 
E
-
 0.9296% 
 
As can be seen, for players with E
≠0
, the expected LIBOR fixing always deviates from M in the first 
three types of games. Under scenarios with collusion or bribes, this deviation is larger. 
 
Matrix A.2: Expected Payoffs from Endowment 
LIBOR 
Base 
Game 
 
E
+
 $333.00 
E
0
 $0.00 
E
-
 $333.00 
LIBOR 
Collusion Game 
 
E
+
 $722.00 
E
0
 $0.00 
E
-
 $722.00 
LIBOR 
Bribe Game 
(B<$704) 
 
E
+
 $704.00 
E
0
 $0.00 
E
-
 $704.00 
 
 
With regards to the expected payoffs from endowments – they are always > 0 for players with E≠0. 
This can be seen as a monetary reward for players with portfolios benchmarked against the LIBOR 
being allowed to play the LIBOR game.  
 
When it comes to the fourth type of game, with reputation and stigma, we get 6 different scenarios. 
The LBOR always deviates from M, with the exception of Scenario VI, and Scenario I for players 
with E
0
: 
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Matrix A.3: Expected LIBOR Fixings (Scenarios I-VI) 
LIBOR 
Game 
with 
Constraints 
Scenario 
I 
Scenario II Scenario III Scenario IV Scenario V Scenario VI 
E
+
 1.0333% 0.9963% 0.9852% 0.9481% 0.9000% 1.0000% 
E
0
 1.0000% 0.9296% 0.9852% 0.9148% 0.9000% 1.0000% 
E
-
 0.9667% 0.9296% 0.9519% 0.9148% 0.9000% 1.0000% 
 
 
The stigma has a significant impact on the expected payoff structure. Except for under Scenarios I 
and VI, players with E
+
 can always expect a negative payoff from the endowment. Players with E
-
, 
on the other hand, benefit greatly under the same circumstances: 
 
Matrix A.4: Expected Payoffs from Endowment (Scenarios I-VI) 
LIBOR 
Game 
with 
Constraints 
Scenario 
I 
Scenario II Scenario III Scenario IV Scenario V Scenario VI 
E
+
 $333.00 -$37.00 -$148.00 -$519.00 -$1,000.00 $0.00 
E
0
 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
E
-
 $333.00 $704.00 $481.00 $852.00 $1,000.00 $0.00 
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Appendix B - Probabilities and Expected LIBOR Outcomes 
 
In the single period LIBOR games, the outcome (both the LIBOR fixing (LF) and the LIBOR 
average (LA)) depend on the strategies of each of the four players. The total number of possible 
outcomes is   , where K is the number of strategy choices, and N0 is the total number of players. 
As the number of players is 4, and the strategy choices 3 (L
H
, L
M
 and L
L
), the total number of 
possible outcomes is K
N0
 = 3
4
 = 81. Next, we use formula for the number of permutations (P) for a 
certain outcome: 
 
(
  
  
)   (
  
  
)   (
  
  
)   
 
where N1 = N0 – U1, N2 = N1 – U2 and N3 = N2 – U3. Let U1 be the number of the first type of 
strategy choice (L
H
), U2 the second type (L
M
) and U3 the third type (L
L
). We can thus begin to work 
out the different possible outcomes, and the probabilities for these to occur. 
 
Example 1: Let us work out the probability of precisely one player submitting L
H
, two players 
submitting L
M
 and one L
L
. The number of players is 4 => N0=4, and the number of different quotes 
to choose from is 3 => K=3. If we call the number of ‘LH’ for U1, number of ‘L
H’ for U2 and 
number of ‘LL’ for U3, we get probability p(L
H
,2L
M
, L
L
) = ( 
 
)   ( 
 
)   ( 
 
) / 81 = 4 * 3 * 1 / 81 = 
12/81 ≈ 0.1481. 
 
The different LIBOR outcomes and probabilities (p) are summarised in Matrix B.1 (with Example 1 
as outcome number 8). The LIBOR average (LA) and the expected LIBOR fixing (LF) are in bold, 
having taken into account the probabilities of each possible outcome and the trimming process 
omitting the highest and lowest quote: 
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Matrix B.1: LIBOR Outcomes and Probabilities 
Outcome  L
H
 L
M
 L
L
 P p Max Min LA LF 
1 4 0 0 1 0.0123 M+α M+α M+α M+α 
2 3 1 0 4 0.0494 M+α M M+3α/4 M+α 
3 3 0 1 4 0.0494 M+α M-α M+α/2 M+α 
4 2 2 0 6 0.0741 M+α M M+α/2 M+α/2 
5 2 1 1 12 0.1481 M+α M-α M+α/4 M+α/2 
6 2 0 2 6 0.0741 M+α M-α M M 
7 1 3 0 4 0.0494 M+α M M+α/4 M 
8 1 2 1 12 0.1481 M+α M-α M M 
9 1 1 2 12 0.1481 M+α M-α M-α/4 M-α/2 
10 1 0 4 4 0.0494 M+α M-α M-α/2 M-α 
11 0 4 1 1 0.0123 M M M M 
12 0 3 4 4 0.0494 M M-α M-α/4 M 
13 0 2 6 6 0.0741 M M-α M-α/2 M-α/2 
14 0 1 4 4 0.0494 M M-α M-3α/4 M-α 
15 0 0 1 1 0.0123 M-α M-α M-α M-α 
Sum    81 1.0000   M M 
 
 
Example 2: Consider outcome number 9 in Matrix B.1, where one player submits L
H
, one player 
L
M
 and two players L
L
. The probability of this to happen is p(L
H
,L
M
,2L
L)) ≈ 0.1481. The trimming 
process ensures that the highest and the lowest quotes will be omitted, i.e. M+α and M-α, yielding a 
LIBOR fixing of: 
 
   
∑   
 
       {  }     {  }
 
 
      
(                   )             
 
   
 
 
 
 
The LIBOR average is the simple arithmetic mean of the 4 quotes: 
 
   
∑   
 
   
 
 
(                   )
 
   
 
 
 
 
Next, at the outset, we know that p(E
+
) = p(E
0
) = p(E
-
) = 1/3, and hence   
    
    
     . 
However, as player Pi knows his own E, he can work out the probabilities and outcomes given each 
of his own strategy choice, where     
      
      
     , as shown in Matrix B.2, B.3 and B.4. 
In other words, if Pi submits L
H
, LA=M+α/4 and LF= M+α/3; if Pi submits L
M
, LA=M and LF= M; 
and if Pi submits L
L
, LA=M-α/4 and LF= M-α/3. Given his incentives and constraints as expressed in 
his payoff function, he chooses which strategy gives the best possible expected payoff. 
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Matrix B.2: Pi submits L
H 
Outcome  L
H
 L
M
 L
L
 Permutations p Max Min LA LF 
1 3 0 0 1 0.0123 M+α M+α M+α M+α 
2 2 1 0 3 0.0494 M+α M M+3α/4 M+α 
3 2 0 1 3 0.0494 M+α M-α M+α/2 M+α 
4 1 2 0 3 0.0741 M+α M M+α/2 M+α/2 
5 1 1 1 6 0.1481 M+α M-α M+α/4 M+α/2 
6 1 0 2 3 0.0741 M+α M-α M M 
7 0 3 0 1 0.0494 M+α M M+α/4 M 
8 0 2 1 3 0.1481 M+α M-α M M 
9 0 1 2 3 0.1481 M+α M-α M-α/4 M-α/2 
10 0 0 3 1 0.0494 M+α M-α M-α/2 M-α 
Sum    27 1.0000   M+α/4 M+α/3 
 
 
Matrix B.3: Pi submits L
M
 
Outcome  L
H
 L
M
 L
L
 Permutations p Max Min LA LF 
1 3 0 0 1 0.0123 M+α M M+3α/4 M+α 
2 2 1 0 3 0.0494 M+α M M+α/2 M+α/2 
3 2 0 1 3 0.0494 M+α M-α M+α/4 M+α/2 
4 1 2 0 3 0.0741 M+α M M+α/4 M 
5 1 1 1 6 0.1481 M+α M-α M M 
6 1 0 2 3 0.0741 M+α M-α M-α/4 M-α/2 
7 0 3 0 1 0.0494 M+α M M M 
8 0 2 1 3 0.1481 M+α M-α M-α/4 M 
9 0 1 2 3 0.1481 M+α M-α M-α/4 M-α/2 
10 0 0 3 1 0.0494 M+α M-α M-α/2 M-α 
Sum    27 1.0000   M M 
 
 
Matrix B.4: Pi submits L
L
 
Outcome  L
H
 L
M
 L
L
 Permutations p Max Min LA LF 
1 3 0 0 1 0.0123 M+α M-α M+α/2 M+α 
2 2 1 0 3 0.0494 M+α M-α M+α/4 M+α/2 
3 2 0 1 3 0.0494 M+α M-α M M 
4 1 2 0 3 0.0741 M+α M-α M M 
5 1 1 1 6 0.1481 M+α M-α M-α/4 M-α/2 
6 1 0 2 3 0.0741 M+α M-α M-α/2 M-α 
7 0 3 0 1 0.0494 M M-α M-α/4 M 
8 0 2 1 3 0.1481 M M-α M-α/2 M-α/2 
9 0 1 2 3 0.1481 M M-α M-3α/4 M-α 
10 0 0 3 1 0.0494 M-α M-α M-α M-α 
Sum    27 1.0000   M-α/4 M-α/3 
 
 
Assuming that all players act out of self-interest and are rational, and that this is common 
knowledge, we can work out the best strategy given each endowment – and systematically the 
different Bayes Nash equilibria under the different constraints and incentives. The different 
thresholds where players would choose to change strategy yield different ‘scenarios’, as the 
probability distribution is altered.  
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Example 3: Consider the situation in Table C.9a in Appendix C, with the constraint: 
 
(        
 
 
 )       
 
 
  . 
 
This scenario involves a fairly small reputational constraint, but the stigma incentive is large 
enough for players with E
0
 to choose to play low, whereas players E
≠0
 stick to original strategies (as 
shown in Table C.9b). Thus, using the probabilities below gives us the expected LIBOR outcomes 
respectively in Matrix B.5, B.6 and B.7: 
 
    
      {    
      
 }      
    
      {    
      
 }    
    
      {    
      
 }      
 
Matrix B.5: Pi submits L
H
 (Scenario II) 
Outcome  L
H
 L
M
 L
L
 Permutations p Max Min LA LF 
1 3 0 0 1 0.0370 M+α M+α M+α M+α 
2 2 0 1 6 0.2222 M+α M-α M+α/2 M+α 
3 1 0 2 12 0.4444 M+α M-α M M 
4 0 0 3 8 0.2963 M+α M-α M-α/2 M-α 
Sum    27 0.1481 M+α M-α M M-α/27 
 
 
Matrix B.6: Pi submits L
M 
(Scenario II) 
Outcome  L
H
 L
M
 L
L
 Permutations p Max Min LA LF 
1 3 0 0 1 0.0370 M+α M M+3α/4 M+α 
2 2 0 1 6 0.2222 M+α M-α M+α/4 M+α/2 
3 1 0 2 12 0.4444 M+α M-α M-α/4 M-α/2 
4 0 0 3 8 0.2963 M M-α M-3α/4 M-α 
Sum    27 0.1481   M-α/4 M-10α/27 
 
 
Matrix B.7: Pi submits L
L 
(Scenario II) 
Outcome  L
H
 L
M
 L
L
 Permutations p Max Min LA LF 
1 3 0 0 1 0.0370 M+α M M+α/2 M+α/2 
2 2 0 1 6 0.2222 M+α M-α M M 
3 1 0 2 12 0.4444 M+α M-α M-α/2 M-α 
4 0 0 3 8 0.2963 M-α M-α M M-α 
Sum    27 0.1481   M-α/2 M-19α/27 
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Appendix C - Beliefs, Expected Payoffs and Expected LIBOR Equilibria 
 
 
Table C.1a: Beliefs (LIBOR Base Game) 
 
LIBOR Base Game 
 
    
      
      
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C.1b: Expected Payoffs (LIBOR Base Game).Optimal Strategies in Bold. 
 
LIBOR Base Game 
 
  
    
    
  
  
  
 
 
      
 
 
   
  
        
  
   
 
 
     
 
 
   
 
 
Table C.1c: Expected LIBOR Equilibria (LIBOR Base Game).Under Optimal Strategies in Bold. 
 
LIBOR Base Game 
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Table C.2a: Beliefs (LIBOR Collusion game) 
 
LIBOR Collusion Game 
 
    
      
      
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
Table C.2b: Expected Payoffs (LIBOR Collusion game).Optimal Strategies in Bold. 
 
LIBOR Collusion Game 
 
  
    
    
  
  
  
  
  
      
  
  
   
  
        
  
   
  
  
     
  
  
   
 
 
Table C.2c: Expected LIBOR Equilibria (LIBOR Collusion game).Under Optimal Strategies in 
Bold. 
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Table C.3a: Beliefs (LIBOR Bribe Game) 
 
  
  
  
   
 
    
      
      
  
  
  
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
        
  
  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Table C.3b: Expected Payoffs (LIBOR Bribe Game).Optimal Strategies in Bold. 
 
  
  
  
   
 
  
    
    
  
  
  
  
  
        
  
  
     
  
        
  
   
  
  
       
  
  
     
 
 
Table C.3c: Expected LIBOR Equilibria (LIBOR Bribe Game).Under optimal Strategies in Bold. 
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Table C.4a: Beliefs (Low Reputational Constraint) 
 
  
 
 
  
 
    
      
      
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C.4b: Expected Payoffs (Low Reputational Constraint).Optimal Strategies in Bold. 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
    
    
  
  
    
 
 
            
 
 
     
  
              
  
     
 
 
           
 
 
     
 
 
Table C.4c: Expected LIBOR Equilibria (Low Reputational Constraint).Under Optimal 
Strategies in Bold. 
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Table C.5a: Beliefs (High Reputational Constraint) 
 
  
 
 
  
 
    
      
      
  
  
        
  
        
  
        
 
 
Table C.5b: Expected Payoffs (High Reputational Constraint).Optimal Strategies in Bold. 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
    
    
  
  
    
 
 
           
 
 
      
  
              
  
     
 
 
          
 
 
      
 
 
Table C.5c: Expected LIBOR Equilibria (High Reputational Constraint).Under Optimal 
Strategies in Bold. 
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Table C.6a: Beliefs (Low Stigma Incentive) 
 
    
  
  
  
 
    
      
      
  
  
  
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Table C.6b: Expected Payoffs (Low Stigma Incentive).Optimal Strategies in Bold. 
 
    
  
  
  
 
  
    
    
  
  
     
 
  
        
  
  
  
 
 
      
  
  
  
 
 
   
  
          
 
 
     
 
 
   
  
    
 
  
       
  
  
  
 
 
     
  
  
  
 
 
   
 
 
Table C.6c: Expected LIBOR Equilibria (Low Stigma Incentive).Under Optimal Strategies in 
Bold. 
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Table C.7a: Beliefs (High Stigma Incentive) 
 
  
  
  
  
 
    
      
      
  
  
        
  
        
  
        
 
 
Table C.7b: Expected Payoffs (High Stigma Incentive).Optimal Strategies in Bold. 
 
  
  
  
  
 
  
    
    
  
  
       
 
 
        
 
  
         
  
     
 
 
      
 
 
     
  
      
 
 
       
 
  
        
 
 
Table C.7c: Expected LIBOR Equilibria (High Stigma Incentive).Under Optimal Strategies in 
Bold. 
 
  
  
  
  
 
  
    
    
  
  
              
  
              
  
              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
Table C.8a: Beliefs (Scenario I) 
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Table C.8b: Expected Payoffs (Scenario I).Optimal Strategies in Bold. 
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Table C.8c: Expected LIBOR Equilibria (Scenario I).Under Optimal Strategies in Bold. 
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Table C.9a: Beliefs (Scenario II) 
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Table C.9b: Expected Payoffs (Scenario II).Optimal Strategies in Bold. 
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Table C.9c: Expected LIBOR Equilibria (Scenario II).Under Optimal Strategies in Bold. 
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Table C.10a: Beliefs (Scenario III) 
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Table C.10b: Expected Payoffs (Scenario III).Optimal Strategies in Bold. 
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Table C.10c: Expected LIBOR Equilibria (Scenario III).Under Optimal Strategies in Bold. 
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Table C.11a: Beliefs (Scenario IV) 
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Table C.11b: Expected Payoffs (Scenario IV).Optimal Strategies in Bold. 
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Table C.11c: Expected LIBOR Equilibria (Scenario IV).Under Optimal Strategies in Bold. 
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Table C.12a: Beliefs (Scenario V) 
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Table C.12b: Expected Payoffs (Scenario V).Optimal Strategies in Bold. 
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Table C.12c: Expected LIBOR Equilibria (Scenario V).Under Optimal Strategies in Bold. 
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Table C.13a: Beliefs (Scenario VI) 
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Table C.13b: Expected Payoffs (Scenario VI).Optimal Strategies in Bold. 
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Table C.13c: Expected LIBOR Equilibria (Scenario VI).Under Optimal Strategies in Bold. 
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